cyclic compensation structures

Economics is a discipline that is replete with examples of situations where individually rationalistic decisions lead to systematic breakdowns. It may make sense for each firm to lay off some of its employees to weather the recession, but when every firm engages in a similar behavior the downturn simply becomes worse. Another example is related to compensation structure of employees. Linking part of the compensation to performance can be beneficial for the company if there are easily verifiable performance metrics. (An employee is in general more motivated to work for his company when he is given the chance to share a slice of the profits.) However a widespread replacement of the traditional fixed salary structure by a performance based variable compensation scheme can be macro economically destabilizing.

In a closed economy where personal consumption constitutes a greater chunk of GDP than government spending and corporate investments, cyclic wages will exacerbate the magnitude of economic expansions and contractions. The current recession in US was triggered by a credit crunch which led to a sudden withdrawal of domestic purchasing power. If wages decrease along with the diminishing profits of companies and there is no increase in government spending and corporate investments, the overall personal consumption will be lower and recession will deepen. On the other hand if wages stay fixed, deflation will increase the real purchasing power of consumers and eventually the economy will once again gather expansionary momentum.

Provision of unemployment benefits will also contribute to stabilization during a downturn. However the way government chooses to finance these benefits is extremely important. Borrowing and taxation may crowd out corporate investments if corporations and government fight for same pool of money. In that case printing money will be a better choice, especially if there is a supply side slack which allows corporations to respond to higher demand by increasing production levels. (If there is no supply side slack, production will not be able to adjust accordingly and higher demand will cause inflation.)

end of acquisition frenzy

The company valuations have gone down significantly and sooner or later people with money should step in to make acquisitions. Why is this not happenning?

Despite whatever is claimed by various advisors most of these low valuations are justified. The near-term cash flows to be generated by companies have become both lower and riskier, and the opportunity cost of spending cash has become greater.

Companies may be getting cheaper but the wealth of potential buyers has diminished as well. Cash represents only a tiny fraction of the outstanding capital. Most of wealth in the world lies in real estate, bonds and common stocks whose values have now gone down significantly.

Moreover credit is hard to come by. The previous acquisitions were mainly financed with borrowed money which is no longer available due to the massive deleveraging process.

What about those with cash? For instance what about those producers that benefited from the short-lived commodity boom? Well... Most of the accumulated cash has already dissipated and thus no longer represents a significant source of buying power. Just have a look at the Russian oligarchs. Instead of sitting on the fortunes generated during the boom period, they decided to make more investments and acquisitions. The majority of these ventures were financed by debt which was collateralized by mines and factories. Now that the cash flows generated by these assets have deteriorated, the covenants on the debt can no longer be met. That is why oligarchs are currently pleading money from Putin. Moreover those who sold their assets to oligarchs are in trouble too. For example Severstal bought Sparrows Point from ArcelorMittal for $810 million. What did ArcelorMittal do with the money? A portion of the money went as interest payments to banks which financed Arcelor’s previous acquisitions, and another portion was used towards the acquisition of new companies some of which were public. In other words, the majority of $810 million has probably dissipated into the hands of risk-averse banks and investors.

creativity and ambivalence

I have always believed that creativity is rooted in a capacity to recognize the overlooked circumstantial elements which can give birth to unusual associations. That is essentially what renders creativity different from mere tinkering. A successful, rapid decision maker needs to stay alert to minute changes in the environment.

However absolute alertness requires a state of hormonal activity that does not lead to lopsided emotional states and selective perception. Perhaps the key is being emotional, but in an ambivalent kind of way.

manipulative representations

Here is yet another visual manipulation of statistical figures. This time it is done by J.P.Morgan. Forget objective analyses of financial information... These guys can not even visually present raw data without letting their sentiments shine through!

Have a look at the circles that are drawn to depict 2.Quarter (2007) and October (2008) market values of Goldman Sachs. It seems as if the area corresponding to "100" is more than two times the area corresponding to "56". The visual representation is clearly misleading.

What J.P.Morgan did was to take a circle with radius of x and place it inside a circle with radius y. The resulting area difference between the two circles is as follows:

[π*(x^2)]-[π*(y^2)] = π*[(x^2)-(y^2)] = π*(x-y)*(x+y)

To understand how this deceitful mechanism works, compare the circles of Morgan Stanley to those of J.P.Morgan. The market value of Morgan Stanley decreased from $49 billions to $21 billions and that of J.P.Morgan decreased from $165 billions to $147 billions. In percentage terms the market value of Morgan Stanley fell more than the market value of J.P.Morgan did. But the difference is not as much as the visual representation suggests:

Real Percentage difference = [(49-21)/49] - [(165-147)/165] = 0.571 - 0.109 = 0.462 = 46.2%

Visual Percentage difference = [[π*(49-21)*(49+21)]/[π*(49^2)]] - [[π*(165-147)*(165+147)]/[π*(165^2)]] = 0.816 - 0.206 = 0.610 = 61%

electricity forward markets

Vargön Alloys A.B. (a subsidiary of Yildirim Holding) has an outstanding electricity contract with the energy company Vattenfall A.B. The contract stipulates a base delivery amount of 60 Mega Watts per Hour. Unfortunately, due to planned production cuts, Vargön Alloys will never be consuming this much electricity next year. Hence the undelivered electricity will have to be sold into the spot market. In order to lock in prices for these future sales, Yildirim Holding decided to engage in derivatives trading in Nordpool which is the common electricity forwarding market of Nordic countries.

When should these forwarding contracts be sold? Does the forwarding market correctly estimate the 2009 spot electricity prices in Sweden? Yildirim Holding is involved in coal trading, but this does not put the company in a more advantageous position than the average energy trader when it comes to making accurate guesses about the future electricity prices in Sweden. Or does it?

The initial reasoning of Yildirim went as follows:

1) Half of the electricity consumption in Sweden is industrial.

2) It is clear that the industry heading for a severe contraction.

3) Along with the electricity consumption, the electricity prices should go down as well.

A few afterthoughts immediately revealed how naïve this reasoning was…

Who was going to be on the other side of the trade when Yildirim sells the electricity forward? It is very likely to be Vattenfall and there is plenty of relevant information that Vattenfall has access to but Yildirim does not. However this should not be a big worry for Yildirim. Since Vattenfall is the market maker in Nordpool, whatever information Vattenfall has should already be reflected in the forward prices. The essential question is whether Yildirim has access to any information that Vattenfall does not.

As an active participant in the Swedish industry, Yildirim has a more accurate picture of the magnitude of the industry’s plight. Hence Yildirim may rightly conclude that the future Swedish electricity consumption will be less than the amount anticipated by the market. But does this necessarily imply that future electricity prices will be lower as well? In other words, is step 3 of the initial reasoning correct?

In the coal market the supply side can not immediately react to drops in consumption. New coal mining projects can be shelved, but existing mining operations cannot immediately be halted. Hence when there are less many buyers out there, the coal stocks start piling up. That is essentially why the prices go down. The dynamics of electricity markets is different. The amount of electricity in the market is always equal to the amount demanded. There may be electricity producers on stand-by, but there is never any excess electricity sitting around. A producer will immediately stop its operations if the best bid in the market does not generate a return above its operational and financial costs.

In Sweden, nuclear reactors and hydropower stations are each responsible for half of the total production. However the electricity price is set in a market that encompasses the whole Nordic region which contains types of producers other than hydro and nuclear:

In above graphics we assume that the consumption is not price-sensitive. (i.e. Regardless the price, the factories and households demand the same quantity of electricity.) This may sound like a weird assumption but it can be justified through the microstructure of the market: The system operator acts as a single buyer, ranks the offers of suppliers from the least expensive to the most, computes the expected demand and pays the marginal supplier's offer to every supplier whose offer was equal to or lower than that of the marginal supplier.

In the Nordic market electricity price is the offer made by the marginal coal power plant. Therefore if production costs stay constant, a fall in demand will cause the current marginal producer to go offline and be replaced by a more efficient one. This will in turn pull the price down since the new marginal producer has a lower cost of production due to greater efficiency. The fall in price will be negligible though since the variation among the production costs of coal power plants is probably not that great. However, if demand falls drastically and the production capacity of dams shoots up due an exceptionally wet weather, all the coal power plants will go offline and the electricity price will tank. Since latter scenario is quite unlikely, step 3 of our initial reasoning can only be thoroughly justified if the production costs do not stay constant.

Regardless the weather, hydropower stations will always stay on due to their extremely low variable costs. Therefore we can safely ignore them for the rest of the analysis. This does not mean we can ignore the future weather conditions completely. (e.g. If the winter is cold, households will consume more electricity for heating purposes.) Nevertheless we will do so because forecasting future weather conditions is extremely hard and whatever is known in a probabilistically significant way is already incorporated into the electricity forward prices.

Variable costs of nuclear reactors do not change much. Hence we will simply ignore them.

The cost of gas turbine generators will never go below that of coal power plants. Since the demand for electricity is projected to contract, not expand, we will ignore possible future changes in gas prices.

World coal market is very dynamic. It contains lots of different suppliers and the trade does not require a pre-established framework as in the gas market where construction of expensive pipelines is a necessity. If everything else stays constant and the coal price goes up (down), the Nordic electricity price will go (down) up as well. (This causation will happen with a lag since the coal power plants have to first go through their inventories which were bought at older prices.) Since the magnitude of possible future price fluctuations in the coal market is greater than the possible future variation among the production costs of coal power plants, Yildirim should focus on world coal prices and not worry about the possibility of a greater-than-anticipated fall in the Swedish electricity consumption.

This assertion can be verified by a glance at the correlation between the 2009 coal and Nordpool electricity forward prices:

(The red dots indicate 2009 coal forward prices since February 2008.)

For some (possibly psychological) reason, today the coal forward prices follow the crude oil futures extremely closely. Therefore Yildirim’s decision to sell electricity forwarding contracts now or later is essentially a bet against the market’s estimation of 2009 oil prices. Hence Yildirim should pay more attention to the US unemployment statistics (which constitute a pretty good indicator of how deep the US recession is) than to the Swedish industrial contraction. (Changes in US GDP affect the oil prices more than changes in Swedish GDP.)

Moreover Yildirim also needs to decide whether the forwarding markets correctly estimate the average 2009 future spot SEK/€ and $/€ exchange rates. (Nordpool trades in Euros, but Yildirim’s contract price with Vattenfall is fixed in Swedish Kronas. / Coal is traded in Dollars, but European coal power plants' income is in Euros.)

P.S. : Two days ago, the European Central Bank announced a 0.75% cut in its main policy interest rate. The Swedish Central Bank countered this move by a much sharper cut of 1.75% and consequently SEK/€ exchange rate jumped up. That is good news for Yildirim! Unfortunately on the same day, U.S. Department of Labor declared an unanticipated drop of 533,000 in nonfarm payroll employment. In response the market pushed Brent crude oil prices below $40 level. That is definitely very bad news for Yildirim!

house prices and vicious cycles

It seems like the current economic situation in US will not improve unless there is some stabilization in the housing market that is continuously being subjected to several vicious cycles which depress the house prices.

Here are some cycles that come to my mind:

(All “house prices” refer to house prices in US unless otherwise stated.)

1) Lower house prices -> The debtor decides to default on his mortgage when the value of the house under his ownership is less than the present value of the future mortgage payments he will be making. -> The defaults lead to higher interests rates on the new mortgages issued. -> Due to higher financing cost some prospective buyers withdraw from the market. -> Less number of buyers –> Lower house prices

2) Lower house prices -> The debtor decides to default on his mortgage when the value of the house under his ownership is less than the present value of the future mortgage payments he will be making. -> Bank seizes the house and puts it on sale. -> More houses on the market. -> Lower house prices

3) Lower house prices -> The creditors are not contractually allowed to ask the mortgage debtors to put up more collateral. Hence lower house prices imply lower recovery values in case of default. -> Assuming that the default probabilities do not decrease, the value of these mortgages decline. -> Banks which hold the mortgage backed securities try to dump them all at the same time. -> Liquidity in the secondary markets dry up. -> Investors demand more discount when they are offered to buy new mortgages. (This is conceptually similar to paying less for a car whose second-hand market is smaller.) -> Higher mortgage rates -> Due to higher financing cost some prospective buyers withdraw from the market. -> Less number of buyers –> Lower house prices

4) Lower house prices -> … See Cycle 3 … -> Liquidity in the secondary markets dry up. -> Due to the drastic decrease in the volume of trades, the prices of these mortgage backed securities can no longer be efficiently determined. -> Banks are stuck with losses that they can no longer mark to market. -> Some of these banks immediately default. Some others default due to speculative attacks by traders who claim that the banks are hiding their losses by employing accounting gimmicks. -> Depositors lose confidence in the financial system and withdraw their money which would otherwise be available to prospective consumers through the banking system. -> Due to higher financing cost some prospective buyers withdraw from the market. -> Less number of buyers –> Lower house prices

5) Lower house prices -> … See Cycle 4… -> Banks are stuck with losses that they can no longer mark to market. -> Each bank uses a different model to value its positions and makes a subjective judgment regarding the amounts to be written off. Each bank thinks that the other banks are underestimating their losses. -> Loss of trust among banks. -> Interest rates in the interbank lending markets go up. –> Since most commercial loans are indexed to interbank lending rates, the cost of capital for the corporations goes up. -> Corporations find it harder to roll-over their previous debts. -> Corporations default. -> Fired employees are forced to default on their mortgages which they can no longer afford to pay or refinance. -> … See Cycle 1 or 2… -> Lower house prices

6) Lower house prices -> … See Cycle 3 … -> Funds which hold the mortgage backed securities try to dump them all at the same time. -> The value of these securities depreciate even further. –> Investors of these funds start to panic. Some of them demand their money back. -> Since the market for mortgage backed securities dried up, the fund managers have no other choice but to sell assets in unrelated markets. -> The fire sale of positions in corporate bond markets increases the cost of capital for corporations. -> Corporations find it harder to roll-over their previous debts. -> …See Cycle 5… -> Lower house prices

7) Lower house prices -> …See Cycle 6… -> Since the market for mortgage backed securities has dried up, the fund managers have no other choice but to sell assets in unrelated markets. -> The fire sale of assets in non-dollar denominated markets leads to an appreciation of dollar against the relevant currencies. (Here we assume that investors want their money back in dollars.) -> The prices of commodities that are traded in dollars go down because buyers with non-dollar denominated incomes can no longer afford the older prices. -> Traders and producers which carry inventories of these commodities are forced to write off some of the value of their stocks. -> These write-offs may be large enough to force the corporations into default. -> Fired employees are forced to default on their mortgages which they can no longer afford to pay or refinance. -> …See Cycle 1 or 2… -> Lower house prices

8) Lower house prices -> …See Cycle 7… -> The fire sale of assets in non-dollar denominated markets lead to an appreciation of dollar against the relevant currencies. (Here we assume that investors want their money back in dollars.) -> Foreign companies which have no income in dollars have harder time paying their dollar denominated liabilities. -> Some of these companies default on their dollar debts or are forced to cut costs to avoid bankruptcy. –> They purchase less goods and invest less. In particular they purchase less imports from US. -> Production cuts in US ->Employees laid off in US -> Fired employees are forced to default on their mortgages which they can no longer afford to pay or refinance. -> …See Cycle 1 or 2… -> Lower house prices

9) Lower house prices -> Wealth of consumers who own houses is decreased. –> Less propensity to spend money on durable goods like automobiles -> Durable goods manufacturers’ revenue expectations now look overly optimistic . Both prices and sales go down. -> These companies find it harder to roll-over their previous debts. Some of them default. -> Sector wide defaults triggers a chain of defaults among the sector’s suppliers, the suppliers’ suppliers etc. -> Massive layoffs -> Fired employees are forced to default on their mortgages which they can no longer afford to pay or refinance. -> … See Cycle 1 or 2… -> Lower house prices

10) Lower house prices -> …See Cycle 9… -> Durable goods manufacturers’ find it harder to roll-over their previous debts. Some of them default. -> Part of these defaulted companies have unfunded pension liabilities. -> Loss of pension savings is equivalent to a reduction of wealth for the fired employees. -> …See Cycle 9… -> Lower house prices

11) Lower house prices -> …See Cycle 9… -> Durable goods manufacturers’ find it harder to roll-over their previous debts. In order to raise cash, some of them prefer to do a fire sale of their inventories. -> The fire sale causes greater deflation in prices. -> Revenues fall further. -> Massive layoffs -> …See Cycle 9… -> Lower house prices

12) Lower house prices -> Wealth of consumers who own houses is decreased. –> Less propensity to spend money on imports -> Production declines in foreign economies. -> In order to raise funds for stimulation packages at home, the foreign governments sell their holdings of US government bonds. (e.g. China and Japan have massive amounts of US treasuries.) -> Interest rates on US government bonds increase. -> Interest rates across all instruments in US increase. (The present value of $1 obtained a year later is worth less since the opportunity cost of spending $1 now has become greater.) -> The value of all cash generating assets gets depressed. -> Lower house prices (Note that a house is essentially a rent generating asset.)

13) Lower house prices -> Wealth of consumers who own houses is decreased. –> Less propensity to spend money on imports -> Foreign currencies depreciate against dollar. -> Imports are now cheaper in dollars. -> US producers need to cut prices to compete with imports. -> Revenues fall and some of these companies default. ->Massive layoffs -> …See Cycle 9… -> Lower house prices

14) Lower house prices -> …See Cycle 13… -> Foreign currencies depreciate against dollar. -> US investors pull back from foreign commercial bond and stock markets as they worry about the depreciating dollar value of their portfolios. -> Cost of capital for foreign corporations goes up. -> These corporations find it harder to roll-over their previous debts. -> Some of these companies default on their debts or are forced to cut costs to avoid bankruptcy. -> …See Cycle 8… -> Lower house prices

15) Lower house prices -> Consumers rationally or irrationally expect this trend to continue. -> They postpone their housing purchases and wait for lower prices. –> Less consumption now -> Lower house prices

16) Lower house prices -> House sellers rationally or irrationally expect this trend to continue. -> They try to front run each other: The one who manages to sell first will do so at a higher price than a late-seller does. -> More houses are put on sale now. -> Lower house prices


Several important things to note:

1) The cycles that are hardest to break are the ones which are based on expectations about future price movements. (e.g. Cycles 15 and 16) The government will need to alter perceptions and manipulate beliefs.

2) Some cycles will dissolve by themselves. In Cycle 11 the manufacturers cannot continue dumping their inventories forever since they only have finite amount of stocks.

3) Defaults, production cuts, layoffs and declining house values decrease the tax base of municipalities and governments. These bodies may increase taxes or issue more bonds in order to prop up their finances. Their actions will have various consequences for the above cycles.

4) Unemployment benefits may act as a safety net that cushions the sudden fall of consumption during layoffs. However the exact effect will vary according to the way the government chooses to raise the necessary money for the unemployment benefits.

5) Private pension funds directly invest in stocks. Hence their value will be adversely affected by corporate defaults and massive fire-sale of stocks. As in Cycle 10, this will lead to lower house prices.

6) World trade is conducted mostly in dollars. For example, in Cycle 13 the net effect on exchange rate movements would be minimal, if the foreign company had never felt the need to convert its dollar denominated income into home currency.

7) So far we have ignored the entire spectrum of derivatives which are instruments that allow economic actors to shift various risks among each other. It would been a much harder task to conduct the above analysis within a world (such as ours!) where various financial risks are cut up, magnified and scattered among unidentifiable investors and speculators. Here are some noteworthy examples:

- A corporation may pass its exchange rate risk onto an investor by entering into an exchange rate forwarding agreement. (Consequently in Cycle 8 instead of the corporation the investor may go bust.)
- If a corporation desires to eliminate its exposure to the fluctuations in the interbank lending rates, it can enter into an interest rate swap agreement and replace its floating debt obligation with a fixed one. (In that case Cycle 5 would need to be revised.)
- A raw materials supplier can reduce its credit risk exposure to its largest customer by purchasing credit default swaps on the customer’s debts. (In that case Cycle 9 would need to be revised.)